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RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2601
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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [UNSC](#) [SR](#) [KV](#) [IT](#)

SUBJECT: D'ALEMA, ISCHINGER POINT TO EU FUTURE FOR SERBIA
AND KOSOVO; CONCEDE LIKELIHOOD OF SUPERVISED INDEPENDENCE

Classified By: Classified by Jonathan R. Cohen, Acting Political Minister Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary. On August 29, EU representative to the Troika Wolfgang Ischinger met with FM D'Alema in Rome to discuss the way forward on Kosovo. D'Alema and Ischinger agreed that Serbia and Kosovo should look toward EU integration as a way to achieve regional stability. Ischinger stated that while the EU should take the lead in helping the Pristina and Belgrade reach a solution, the EU would neither mediate negotiations nor present its own plan. Ischinger noted that should the two sides fail to reach an agreement, the Ahtisaari plan remains on the table. Privately, Ischinger and D'Alema were pessimistic about the possibility of a mutually agreed solution and believed supervised independence would be the likely outcome. End Summary.

¶2. (C/NF) On August 29 in Rome EU Troika representative Ischinger met with FM D'Alema in advance of the August 30 talks in Vienna. In statements to the press, Ischinger characterized the Kosovo issue as "Europe's frozen conflict" and noted that the status quo was untenable. D'Alema and Ischinger agreed that EU integration of both Serbia and Kosovo should be the ultimate outcome, regardless of the final status solution. In Ischinger's view, the Troika should facilitate but not mediate negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, nor should the EU or the Troika present any new plans. The EU would support any mutually acceptable solution, but if the two sides fail to come to an agreement, the Ahtisaari plan remained on the table. Ischinger and D'Alema noted that the international community has done everything possible to lead the two parties to a negotiated solution, and should this final period of discussion prove ineffective, the failure would rest squarely with the two parties.

¶3. (C/NF) On the question of Russia, Ischinger noted that the international community had made it clear that the Kosovo issue is a special case and cannot serve as a precedent for resolving other frozen conflicts. Ischinger surmised that Russia understood this, "otherwise they would not have participated in the Troika".

¶4. (C/NF) Comment. According to the German Polcouns,

privately Ischinger and D'Alema were pessimistic about the possibility of a negotiated solution and agreed that the process was headed toward supervised independence. Ischinger had been concerned about possible Italian lack of support for supervised independence in the absence of a UNSC resolution. Instead, he found that D'Alema recognized a relatively quick solution was necessary and would likely involve difficult decisions by Italy and the rest of the EU.

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